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22 November 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [redacted] EA/DCI
[redacted] EA/DDCI

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SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary of State Shultz, and
Messrs. Whitehead, Armacost, and Abramowitz.
22 November 1988 - 1100 hours - State Dept.

TAB A Panama. The Secretary of State is interested in reviewing the Panamanian situation. The Secretary is likely to ask for your views on whether the Noriega problem can be resolved now. Also, he may ask whether the Intelligence Oversight Committees will go along with Panama III at this point in time.

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TAB B Libya: CW Program. You may want to discuss with the Secretary implications of possible actions that could be taken to eliminate the Libyan CW capability. You may wish to inform Secretary Shultz that DI analysts believe Libya would strongly resist any US political initiatives to undermine its chemical warfare program, and almost certainly would retaliate violently in response to a US military strike on the plant. Retaliation probably would be in the form of terrorist attacks against US personnel and facilities. Such


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attacks could even be carried out by elite Libyan military units and could include mining sea lanes in the Mediterranean or placing limpet mines on US vessels in Mediterranean ports.



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TAB C



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TAB D



TAB E

Moscow Embassy. You may want to discuss the recent proposal by the ADDO/CI, [redacted] that we consider another alternative in addressing our needs in Moscow. In his proposal the ADDO/CI recommends we consider selling the new office building (NOB) and adjacent quarters to the Soviets in return for a new site in Lenin Hills. (You'll recall that General Powell told you a private US investor [redacted] has indicated a willingness to buy the entire US Embassy complex.) A condition would be that the Soviets do not occupy the NOB or their new chancery at Mt. Alto until our Lenin Hills site is completed. The ADDO/CI argues that the above proposal would save money and time.

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[redacted]
and avoid the embarrassment to the Soviets of our destroying the NOB. [redacted]

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TAB F

Drawdown/Closure of U.S. Embassy Kabul. You may want to discuss U.S. official presence in Kabul with the Secretary.


Historically, we have argued to maintain an Agency presence in Kabul as long as possible. Recently, however, with the rapid deterioration of order, we have told the Department of State we will support both a drawdown and ultimate closure of the U.S. Embassy when State officials so decide. We have changed our position because we do not believe we can ensure the security of U.S. personnel under the present circumstances. [redacted]

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NO TAB



NO TAB Biological Warfare: Possible Request for Paper. The Secretary continues to be interested in biological warfare and may ask you to initiate a Community study looking at biological warfare programs around the world. You may wish to tell him that the DI's Office of Scientific and Weapons Research (OSWR) is presently concluding work on an Intelligence Assessment addressing this issue and entitled Hidden Players in a Death Game: Biological Warfare Proliferation Worldwide. This paper could well be printed within the next month or so.

The following items are provided for your information in case the subjects arise during your meeting.

TAB G Afghanistan: Recent Developments. Over the last two weeks, the Soviets have continued to rely on air power to support regime forces and to keep the insurgents at bay. Despite threats to remain in Afghanistan beyond 15 February, the Soviets continue to plan and prepare for withdrawal. In particular, Soviet media last week provided assurances from government officials that the troops will be home on schedule. As for the recent Soviet campaign to step up military pressure on the insurgents, DI analysts believe pressure could be expanded to include aircraft and missile attacks against insurgent supply depots inside Pakistan. We believe, however, the Soviets (or Afghanistan regime) are unlikely to initiate more than just a few such strikes because they fear the potential international backlash that could result. [redacted] an explosion--which destroyed a

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small gun and ammunition store--was attributed to a missile by villagers who had never seen or heard anything like it before. He also indicated that the amount of damage described seemed relatively small for a direct hit on a marketplace by a Scud.

You should also know that Soviet Ambassador Vorontsov told our Charge in Kabul on 15 November that details of the Soviet approach to withdrawal and a political solution in Afghanistan would be presented by Gorbachev to American officials in New York. Vorontsov indicated the Soviets wanted the US to help put together an internal political solution in Afghanistan and that if we were unwilling to assist, the Soviets would turn to other parties--he implied such parties would include Iran and Pakistan.

At TAB G are talking points that expand on these issues.

TAB H Iran: Latest Developments. The Secretary may want to discuss continuing factionalism within Iran and the prospects for Iranian rapprochement with the US. DI analysts believe Rafsanjani remains the preeminent political leader in Iran after the Ayatollah, but that he continues to face opposition from radicals including Prime Minister Musavi and Minister of Interior Motashami-Pur. No rival appears sufficiently strong, however, to mount a successful coup, although assassination attempts are possible. As for rapprochement with the US, DI analysts believe it is unlikely Rafsanjani would seek better ties with the US anytime soon.

Attached at Tab H are talking points that expand on these issues.

TAB I Brazil: Pressures for a Coup. The Secretary may want to discuss prospects for a coup in Brazil and the chances that Leonel Brizola would be elected President in next year's (November 1989) Presidential election. Although economic pressures are building in Brazil--it is faced with a severe debt problem and inflation approaching 1,000 percent annually--DI analysts believe the military is not likely to intervene unless worsening social conditions lead to a breakdown of civil order.

[redacted] that key Brazilian industrialists are sending signals, through ex-President General Geisel, to the military high command that intervention is necessary. Geisel reportedly has firmly rejected the plea, at least for now. As for next year's Presidential election, the deteriorating economy is improving Leonel Brizola's election prospects. He is a leftist long at odds with the military. While it is probably too early to speculate, DI analysts suspect the military would allow Brizola to take office.

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Attached at Tab I are talking points that expand on this issue [redacted] Also attached for your information is a brief report on Secretary Carlucci's recent trip to Brazil.

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TAB J Nicaragua/Honduras: Resettling the Contras. The Secretary may ask you what Honduran leaders believe should be done with the Contras in Honduras and how soon the US can expect pressure to mount to resolve this issue. According to DI analysts, Honduras is growing weary of hosting Nicaraguan insurgents and wants Washington to resettle them and their families in the United States. [redacted] Honduran leaders have indicated they are willing to wait until March 1989 for the new US Administration to decide on the specifics of a resettlement program-- March 1989 is when the US Humanitarian Aid Program runs out.

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Attached are talking points dealing with this issue which provide an update on the Contra situation in Nicaragua--information on resettling the Contras is located on the last page of the talking points.

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Talking Points for the DCI

17 November 1988

The Libyan Chemical Weapons Program: Options for US Influence

In our judgment, Libya will resist strongly US political initiatives to undermine its chemical warfare (CW) program and would react violently to a military strike aimed at neutralizing it. Libyan leader Qadhafi has denied publicly that the Rabta Technology Center produces chemical warfare agents--claiming it is a pharmaceutical plant--but has asserted Libya's right to possess any type of weapon it chooses.

--Tripoli views a CW capability as essential to keep pace with regional powers also possessing chemical weapons including Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and especially Israel.

--As in the past, Qadhafi almost certainly will reject US accusations regarding Libya's CW capability by pointing to US and Israeli chemical and nuclear programs. [redacted]

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We believe a US effort to prevent Libyan use of chemical weapons--as opposed to their possession--has a greater likelihood of success:

--Washington could quietly but strongly warn Tripoli--perhaps through a senior emissary--that it will not tolerate Libyan use of chemical weapons or their transfer to third parties and that such Libyan actions would have grave consequences. A similar warning from one or more NATO allies would reinforce the message.

--Washington could support overt efforts to mobilize international opinion against Libyan CW with a covert propaganda campaign in the Arab world and Africa focusing on the military and terrorist threat posed by Libya's chemical weapons. [redacted]

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Libya is dependent on foreign firms to sustain production at Rabta and Washington could urge foreign governments, especially West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan, to prevent their companies from continuing to support the Libyan program.

--The United States would have to successfully mobilize international opinion against the Libyan program for this option to succeed. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Reaction to US Attack

Qadhafi almost certainly would retaliate for a US military strike on Rabta. The most likely form of retaliation would be terrorist attacks against US personnel and facilities, but attacks by elite Libyan military units also are possible.

--Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that Libya was behind several anti-US attacks this year.

--Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units that could mount covert attacks against US targets along the Mediterranean littoral. Navy commandos, for example, could attack US ships in port with limpet mines, or mine sea lanes.

--Either Libyan response would be accompanied by a vigorous diplomatic effort to obtain condemnation of the United States in international fora.

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SUBJECT: Talking Points for DDCI 17 November 1988 Meeting with Secretary of State - Moscow New Embassy Building Replacement

--The decision to tear down the New Office Building (NOB) and rebuild will be very costly (the estimates range from \$150-\$300 million) and will take a great deal of time (at least five years).

--Consideration should be given to the following proposal:

We offer to sell the NOB and the surrounding quarters to the Soviets; they, in turn, give us a new site in Lenin Hills (where most Western embassies are currently being constructed). Once we have completed our embassy and new living quarters around it in Lenin Hills, we turn over the previous NOB and the surrounding apartments to the Soviets; they do not occupy the NOB until our construction in Lenin Hills is completed. They would not occupy their new chancery at Mt. Alto until our new site in Lenin Hills is completed.

--The above proposal, if accepted by the Soviets, would achieve several goals:

(a) it would save money (deconstruction is very expensive)

(b) it would save time



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(d) it conceivably would avoid the embarrassment to the Soviets of us tearing down our building

--The argument that we would learn much about Soviet bugging technology during deconstruction is not a very good one. The technology is old and more than likely there is nothing highly sophisticated to be found.

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SUBJECT: Update on Discussions Concerning Drawdown or Closure
of the U.S. Mission in Kabul

REFERENCE: Talking Points on same subject of 16 November 1988

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[REDACTED] At that meeting everyone was leaning towards closure rather than drawdown. NEA Bureau's DAS Howard Schaeffer was tasked to write a decision memorandum for the Secretary of State recommending closure of the Embassy.

The memo will also address what effect the closure of the Embassy in Kabul might have on U.S.- Soviet relations. The point will be made to the Soviets that the closure of the Embassy is being undertaken strictly for security reasons and it does not reflect any hardening of the U.S. position vis a vis Afghanistan. The Soviets will be told that the closure simply reflects our lack of confidence in the Soviet and the Afghan regime's ability to provide security for U.S. Mission personnel in Kabul.

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21 November 1988

TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

Afghanistan: Recent Developments

Over the last two weeks the Soviets have continued to rely on airpower to support regime forces and to keep the insurgents at bay. Soviet ground forces, while mainly occupied defending Soviet positions and lines of communications, did deploy east of Kabul earlier this month to relieve pressure on regime forces.

Despite threats to remain in Afghanistan beyond the 15 February deadline, the Soviets have continued to plan and prepare for withdrawal.

- According to [redacted] the commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan told his senior officers on 25 October that the start of the last phase of withdrawal will be suspended for only "one to two months." He also told them the withdrawal would be completed by 15 February.

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[redacted] concerning meetings between 40th Army officers and members of the Soviet Central Committee in Kabul indicate the Soviets continue to plan to get out on time.

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- Soviet domestic media have given prominent play recently to assurances that the troops will be home on schedule. Such emphasis would be unlikely if the Soviets intended to stay much beyond 15 February.
- The Soviets have prepared an advanced radar at Bagram for travel. Identical radars at Qandahar and Shindand were readied to leave their bases in mid-March, roughly two months before the start of the first phase of withdrawal.

If the current bombing campaign fails to stem growing insurgent military pressure on Soviet forces, however, the Soviets may be forced to bring in additional troops to ensure the safety of their withdrawal.

The resistance continues to increase military pressure on the regime despite the recent Soviet escalation of the air war and Moscow's continuing quest for a political solution.

- Probably in response to the Soviet announcement suspending their troop withdrawal and the recent air

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activity, the insurgents have increased their pressure on the road north from Kabul and are preparing for attacks on Shindand and Qandahar Airfields.

- The insurgents also continue to threaten Jalalabad, and have forced the regime to conduct a sweep operation to reopen the road between Jalalabad and the Pakistani border. Kabul's troops recaptured Towr Kham, however, the insurgents continue to contest regime forces for control of major portions of the road between Kabul and Jalalabad.

What is the possibility that the Soviets and the Afghans would attack insurgent facilities in Pakistan?

Moscow could further escalate its current campaign of stepped-up military pressure by using aircraft and missiles they have based in Afghanistan to strike insurgent supply depots inside Pakistan.

- The Soviets are unlikely to go beyond a few such strikes, however, both because the international backlash from concerted attacks on Pakistani territory would probably be severe and because the Soviets have hopes that the new government emerging from the Pakistani elections will prove more accommodating.

- Recent claims by Afghan officials that they control the recently delivered Scuds and that the Soviets will soon deliver more advanced weapons to them may have been intended to relieve the Soviets of any direct responsibility for rocket attacks on Pakistan. Several press reports last week claimed that a Scud missile launched by the Afghan Army struck a Pakistani village killing ten people.

[redacted] an explosion--which destroyed a small gun and ammunition store--was attributed to a missile by villagers who had never seen or heard anything like it before. He also indicated that the amount of damage described seemed relatively small for a direct hit on a marketplace by a Scud.

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Talking Points for the DCI

21 November 1988

Iran: Political Situation

Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani remains the preeminent political leader in Iran after Ayatollah Khomeini, but Rafsanjani faces continuing opposition from some radicals.

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- Prominent opponents include Prime Minister Musavi and Minister of Interior Motashami-Pur. Some elements of the Revolutionary Guard also oppose Rafsanjani and Guard members reportedly have tried to assassinate him.
- We believe the radicals would have difficulty mounting a successful coup. No rival seems to have sufficient support within the factionalized Guard. We believe that assassination attempts will continue to be a serious threat, however.
- Rafsanjani's opponents will try to undercut or block his efforts to improve relations with the West and to seek foreign assistance in rebuilding the economy.
- [redacted] Rafsanjani is considering running for the Presidency in next August's elections to help consolidate his hold on power. (As President, Rafsanjani could nominate a new prime minister and cabinet, and would head the Supreme Defense Council, thus significantly increasing his ability to shape economic and military policy.) [redacted]

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Rafsanjani seems strong enough for now to continue the trend toward a pragmatic foreign policy.

- Rafsanjani has gained Khomeini's public endorsement of his policies and is skilled at exploiting division among his opponents.
- Rafsanjani's future strength will ultimately depend on his ability to negotiate a peace settlement with Iraq that most Iranians consider honorable and to ensure that economic recovery meets public expectations.

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Iran and United States

Rafsanjani probably believes Iran would benefit from improved relations with the US, but strong opposition by many in the leadership make it unlikely the Speaker will seek better ties any time soon.

-- [redacted] most of Rafsanjani's supporters believe that Iran should not seek better ties until it can deal from a position of strength. Most radicals still view relations with the United States as a betrayal of the revolution and will try to use any such move to undermine Rafsanjani. [redacted]

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US Hostages. We believe that Iran probably will continue to use the hostages as bargaining chips to gain concessions from the US. We do not believe Iran can unilaterally order the release of the hostages but must bargain with the hostage-holders.

-- Iran at some point might try to secure the release of one or more US hostages to tempt the US into dealing for the remaining captives.

-- Iranian leaders are unlikely in the near future to agree on releasing all the hostages unless Washington meets Iran's demand for the return of assets frozen in the US.

[redacted]

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ALA/SCD/East

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21 November 1988

TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

BRAZIL: THE ECONOMY AND PROSPECTS FOR A COUP

[redacted] indicate that some leaders in the Brazilian military and its traditional allies in the business community have become so worried by the rapid escalation of inflation that they are talking about a coup. We, too, are concerned about the economy, but we see little likelihood that the military--burned badly by its experience with the economy in the early 1980s--can be convinced to intervene unless worsening social conditions lead to a breakdown of civil order. [redacted]

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Growing Economic Problems

Brazil's economy, now laboring under a massive \$120 billion foreign debt, has been a major political issue ever since the military gave way to a civilian government in 1985.

- President Sarney's administration has been characterized by vacillating economic policies. Sarney has been preoccupied with securing a five-year mandate in the recently completed constitution and has steadfastly refused to tackle tough economic problems face-to-face.

This year, the economy has steadily gone from bad to worse.

- Inflation last month hit a record 27 percent, and is expected to surpass 900 percent for 1988 as a whole, a sharp rise from last year's already high 365 percent.
- Despite monthly cost-of-living adjustments for salaries, wage earners have seen their real incomes erode about 30 percent so far this year. Strikes--some violent--have nearly paralyzed key sectors of the economy, including fuel refining and distribution, steel production and electricity generation. [redacted]

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A recently announced agreement between some business and labor leaders to limit price increases for 60 days, dubbed "the social pact", is unlikely to prove successful in dampening inflationary expectations.

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- [REDACTED]
- The Sarney government has yet to make its contribution-- sharp budget cuts--to the pact. While the Finance Minister is proposing serious measures, consistent support from Sarney in implementing politically painful cutbacks is far from certain.
 - Even if he agrees to the proposals, Brazil's new Constitution has stripped him of his decree powers, and he will need to obtain congressional support for any budget cuts--which is by no means assured. [REDACTED]

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In the meantime, the pact has stabilized previously jittery financial markets and alleviated at least temporarily the specter of hyperinflation.

- Even so, Brazil's economy has a long way to go to halt its downward slide, and the prospects that the Sarney government will make the hard choices necessary to put it on the right track are practically nil.
- The best that can be hoped for is that things will muddle through until a new president takes over in 1990. Even then, solutions will not be easy. [REDACTED]

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Military Concerns

Economic deterioration, combined with recent violence at a steelworkers strike and the leftward turn in last week's municipal elections, has set off alarm bells in some military circles and among their allies in the business sector.

- [REDACTED] senior officers are involved with businessmen and bankers in contingency planning for possible military intervention. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] that key industrialists in Sao Paulo are sending signals--through ex-president General Geisel--to the high command that intervention is necessary. Geisel reportedly has firmly rejected the plea for now. [REDACTED]

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Even given the dire economic situation, we do not believe that military intervention is imminent.

- In our view, while some officers have probably seen enough of "politics in action" and hanker for decisive leadership, most are content to wield power behind the scenes while they wait to see how the next presidential sweepstakes plays out.

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- Most officers could probably be convinced to intervene directly only if "social chaos" erupted and civil order broke down. [REDACTED]

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Presidential Elections

One of the military's foremost fears about the scheduled November 1989 presidential election is that Leonel Brizola, a controversial leftist long at odds with the generals, will win. The high command flexed its political muscle last spring to help ram a fifth year for Sarney through Congress, in large part to put off a Brizola candidacy. [REDACTED]

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In our view, however, the declining economy has enhanced Brizola's prospects.

- Although polling suggests that Brizola carries negative political baggage with him, he is a charismatic figure who will most likely make the run-off in the election.
- Moreover, left-of-center parties likely to rally around him in a run-off have won key cities in last week's municipal election--seen by many observers as a preview of the presidential campaign. [REDACTED]

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While reporting has been mixed, [REDACTED] indicate that the military will allow Brizola to take office if elected, but will watch his actions carefully.

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- Brizola knows this and has been wooing the military and business groups. [REDACTED]

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From an economic perspective, a Brizola presidency almost certainly would cause new headaches for Washington.

- He would likely take unilateral radical action on the foreign debt by limiting interest payments, for example.
- He also favors nationalizing the banking sector, and reducing foreign investment and imports in general, heralding a more restrictive trade policy. [REDACTED]

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21 November 1988

SECRETARY CARLUCCI'S TRIP TO BRAZIL

Secretary Carlucci arrived home yesterday after a brief four-day trip to Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro. While the visit was billed in a low-key manner--Carlucci once served in Brazil as a foreign service officer and has several friends there--it ended up including meetings with key officials and a press conference. The highlights of the trip include the following:

- In his press conference, Carlucci reiterated US concern over the proliferation of missiles, chemical warfare, and nuclear weapons. He noted continued US concern over Brazilian arms sales--especially missiles--to such pariah states as Libya, but expressed US interest in cooperating with Brazil on technological matters under the Missile Technology Control Regime.
- In his meeting with Finance Minister Nobrega, Carlucci pointed out that the US would be unwilling to create a new debt mechanism that would place the burden for Brazil's debt on US taxpayers' shoulders.
- Carlucci also met with Mines and Energy Minister Chaves-- Vice President under the former military government--to discuss US concerns about Brazil's nuclear program and express his satisfaction to Chaves about the state of bilateral of military-to-military relations. [REDACTED]

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The Secretary apparently met with some of the generals serving in the Sarney administration, but we have not yet received any reporting on the discussions. [REDACTED]

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- It is possible that the Secretary will be able to pass on some comments this week on the current state of thinking in the military about the economic situation. [REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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ALA/MCD/NIC

[Redacted]

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16 November 1988

TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

Nicaragua

The Fighting Sputters On

Combat activity remains at a low level in the aftermath of Hurricane Joan, although government forces continue to arrest insurgent supporters and keep guerrillas on the move.

-- [Redacted] indicates joint Sandinista Army and Ministry of Interior operations against small groups of insurgents and their supporters in northern and central Nicaragua (MR 1, 5, and 6).

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-- The few insurgents remaining inside Nicaragua carry out an occasional ambush, but overall they are trying to avoid contact with Sandinista forces.

[Redacted]

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Meanwhile [Redacted] that the Sandinista counterinsurgency forces which recently moved to south-central Nicaragua are trying to locate and attack insurgents who represent the greatest threat in the area. Swollen rivers and mud from Hurricane Joan are slowing their efforts, however, and may delay large-scale operations a few more weeks.

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Disputes Flare Within the Resistance Directorate

Infighting in the insurgent political Directorate is intense, particularly between Adolfo Calero and Alfredo Cesar; but a split in the movement does not appear imminent as the political leaders await signals from Washington.

-- [Redacted] say Calero sponsored a recent ad in the Costa Rican press demanding the expulsion of Cesar, who leads a faction of exiled left-leaning parties affiliated with the insurgent movement.

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-- For his part, Cesar is attempting to dominate the movement's political agenda by persuading the Directorate to adopt his plan for peace talks with Managua and to abandon the military option.

[Redacted]

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- [REDACTED]
- Cesar also is promoting the concept of a smaller, reorganized directorate, consisting of himself, military chief Bermudez, and Aristides Sanchez. This proposal is clearly aimed, at least in part, at removing his rivals from the insurgent leadership.
 - Pressure will continue to build within the Directorate and an eventual split is likely unless members achieve some consensus on a long-term strategy towards the Sandinistas. [REDACTED]

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The Economy Sinks Further

Fueled by Sandinista mismanagement and last month's destructive hurricane, Nicaragua's economic problems remain intractable:

- Consumer price inflation may reach five figures by the end of 1988 as shortages of food and other consumer goods intensify.
- Purchasing power, consumer demand, and national output probably will continue to fall.
- Foreign exchange earnings will remain depressed, depriving the economy of many of the basic inputs it needs to function. [REDACTED]

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International relief efforts following the storm probably have fallen well short of the regime's expectations and needs, but the Sandinistas' firm grip on power is unlikely to be threatened.

- Cuba has provided the most relief, with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries also contributing substantial amounts of aid.
- The regime undoubtedly is dismayed by the tepid response of Western donors to the disaster; bilateral assistance has been largely non-financial and channeled through non-governmental organizations.
- Nonetheless, low public expectations and the weak position of regime opponents make it unlikely that the Sandinistas' political dominance will be challenged even if relief efforts prove inadequate. The acceleration of the economic slide, however, could spark more sporadic, and possible violent protests and food riots. [REDACTED]

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Honduran Concerns Grow


Honduras is growing weary of hosting the Nicaraguan insurgents and is pressing Washington to resettle the combatants and their families in the United States. Public opinion polls show that some 70 percent of Hondurans want the insurgents out of Honduras.

- Senior Honduran military officers are expressing anger with Washington's handling of the Nicaraguan insurgency, [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] Officers are particularly worried about the security implications of the 15,000-man Honduran Army trying to disarm and contain 12,000 armed insurgents now camped in southern Honduras. 25X1

- A majority of Hondurans enthusiastically supported their Foreign Minister's call in early October for a UN-supervised border force, [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] the intent of the proposal was to force the United States to resolve the problems posed by the continued presence of anti-Sandinista combatants in Honduras. 25X1

- Honduran leaders now say they are willing to wait until March 1989 for the new US administration to decide how to resettle the Nicaraguans, but insist that Washington alone must bear the cost and take responsibility for the insurgents, their supporters, and families. [redacted] 25X1

Military Situation in Nicaragua



Area of heaviest hurricane damage

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